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Even though commenting Aristotle's Physics belonged to the curricu-
lum in the study of arts at the studia and universities of the 1290s, brother
John Duns must have preferred De anima as his main reading in natural
sciences and, as a result, left no commentary on the Physics behind.
Although his choice did not stem from some disregard for the matters phy-
sical, since he discussed them at length in his commentaries on the Meta-
physics and Sentences, yet the absence of a genuine exposition of the pro-
blems discussed in the Physics must have been causing some confusion
amongst his disciples' and followers, especially after Scotism had been
adopted, at first unofficially, as the doctrine of the Seraphic Order. The
missing parts of his teaching soon started being supplemented by other
Franciscan scholars in order to cover the whole spectrum of philosophical
disciplines. One of the first Scotist philosophers of nature was Antonius
Andreae, a Catalan friar and disciple of Duns Scotus. He was the author
of two works in natural philosophy: a treatise De tribus principiis naturae
and a commentary on the Physics. Unfortunately, the latter work seems
to have been lost and we know about it only from a remark in the former. 1
There exists, however, a commentary on the Physics attributed to An-
tonius Andreae. The library of Gonville & Caius College in Cambridge"
possesses a manuscript (rns 368 (590)), first mentioned by Marti de Barce-
1 Antonius mentions his commentary in the initial question of his De tnbus principiis natu-
rae, Venetiis 1489, f. 1va: «Dico quod tempus est idem realiter ipsi motui licet formaliter ab eo
distinguatur, ut exposui quarto Physicorum». De tribus principiis naturae is the earliest of Anto-
nius' known works but the introductory question might have been composed later for the revised
version of the treatise. Cf. M. GENSLER,The making of a 'Doctor Dulafluus': Antonius Andreae
and his position in formation of Scotism, «Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia», vru, 1996,
pp. 60-61.
2 I would like to express my thanks to the Master and Fellows of Gonville & Caius College,
Cambridge for their kind permission to publish the manuscript.
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Iona," which contains certain Questiones Antonij super Phisica. The title
was evidently added later, so it is difficult to say whether its author
had any information concerning the authorship of the text. It is possible
that he could have been influenced by the fact that the other text in-
cluded in the codex, the Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae, is indeed
the work of Antonius Andreae. It is also possible that he was convinced
of Antonius Andreae's authorship of the Quaestiones in VIII libros Phy-
sicorum judging from the information the questions themselves provide.
The analysis of the initial question 4 shows that it is largely modelled on
the initial question of Antonius Andreae's De tribus principiis naturae.
The name of Antonius, however, is conspicuously absent," even though
the author makes explicit references to a number of other Franciscan
thinkers active in the first half of the 14th century: Peter Auriol, Francis
of Marchia, Landulf of Caracciolo, Geraldus Odonis and William of
Ockham. Some of these references enable us to establish an approximate
date for the commentary: it must have been written no sooner than 1325.6
Assuming that Antonius Andreae lived until 1333 it is not impossible that
he might have been the author of the commentary. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that Antonius, who had long been back in his native Aragon, had
such a good knowledge of contemporary Franciscan masters active at
Paris. What is more likely is that the commentary was composed by his
younger con/rater who must have been in touch with the Studium Gener-
ale in Paris in the second quarter of the 14th century.
The questions to the fourth book of the Physics are divided almost
evenly into two parts corresponding to the main subjects discussed by Aris-
totle: the problem of place is the subject of first four questions, time is cov-
ered by the following four, with one more question devoted to number in-
serted into that group. The author of the commentary formulates his ques-
3 Cf. P. MART!DEBARCELONA,Fr. Antoni Andreu, o.M., doctor dulafluus, «Criterion», V,
1929, pp. 312-346.
4 For the edition of the question, see: M. GENSLER,The Question on the Subject-matter 0/
Physics from the 'Quaestiones in VIII libros Pbysicorum' Ascribed to Antonius Andreae, «Studia
Mediewistyczne», XXXII, 1997, pp. 23-46.
5 For a detailed comparison of the two questions, see: M. GENSLER,Two quaestiones con-
cerning the subject matter 0/ physics; an early Scotist reception 0/Aristotle, in: J. Marenbon (ed.),
Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, Turnhout, Brepols, 1996, pp. 195-209.
6 Cf. N. Kretzmann & al. (eds.), The Cambridge History 0/ Later Middle Ages, Cambridge,
CUP, 1982, p. 861. For a detailed analysis of the question, see: M. GENSLER,The Concept o/Va-
cuum in a Scotist 'Physics' Commentary Attributed to Antonius Andreae, «Miscellanea Mediaeva-
lia», XXV, 1998, pp. 168-178.
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tions on time as follows: he starts with Utrum tempus sit aliqua entitas pra-
eter animam existens (Whether time is an entity existing beyond the soul),
the next question is Utrum instans secundum substantiam sit idem vel man-
eat idem et unum in toto tempore (Whether an instant is or remains sub-
stantially the same and one in all time). After the inserted question on num-
ber (Utrum numerus sit aliqua realis entitas absoluta distincta essentialiter a
rebus numeratis) he discusses two more questions Utrum tempus sit men-
sura cuiuslibet durantis plus quam per instans (Whether time is a measure
of anything that lasts longer than an instant) and Utrum tempus sit idem
realiter cum motu (Whether time is really the same as motion), the last
question being left unfinished, missing the discussion of some theses and
the reply to rationes principales.
Even incomplete, the questions provide enough material for discus-
sion of the author's ideas concerning time, both in the broad and in
the narrow sense. The discussion is facilitated by the author himself,
whose analysis' of the issue abounds with distinctions, sets of properties,
conditions and criteria, clearly showing the scholastic character of the
work. It seems worthwhile, therefore to start with those distinctions,
which give some insight to the author's understanding of the concepts
and their mutual relations.
In the beginning we are presented with a number of ideas universally
accepted by philosophers. He states that it is generally agreed that eternity,
aevum and time, together with instant understood in four different ways,
are certain measures. Quoting Boethius' De consolatione the author says
that eternity is a measure proper only for God's existence, which has no
beginning or end, whereas aevum is an appropriate measure for all perma-
nent beings, since it is separated from any kind of motion." In presenting
time as the measure of mobile or successive things, he invokes the authority
of pseudo-Dionysian De divinis nominibus; he adds that being the measure
of motion time is, consequently, accidentally a measure of rest." Both ae-
vum and time measure duration, since it is characteristic not only of tem-
7 ANTONIUSANDREAE(?), Quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum, f. 90r: «Aeternitas in quan-
tum est mensura divinae existentiae ubi nee prineipium nee finis, de qua Boethius tertio De con-
solatione dicit: "Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae simul et tota possessio" L..] Aevum autem est
mensura cuiuslibet permanentis sive sit substantia, sive sit accidens, dummodo praescindit a mu-
tatione quacumque, ita quod suum subiectum est sempiternum».
8 Ibidem: «Tempus dicitur quod est mensura mobilis et motus et per accidens quietis. L..J
Unde tempus solum est mensura successivorum, de quo dicit Dionysius libro De divinis nomini-





poral but also for permanent beings, like angels." The concepts of instant
discussed by our author are somewhat puzzling, as only one of them, the
instant of time, measures change. It is, namely, an elementary change of
a subject, called mutatum esse. The remaining three types of instants mea-
sure priority and posteriority in nature, cognition and origin (which is sup-
posed to follow the priority of nature);'? It is clear that they refer to other
than temporal senses of the term 'priority' and, consequently, form other
types of measure. Indeed, the author concedes that measuring duration
is only one out of five types of measures.l '
Having accepted that eternity, aevum, time and instant are measures
the author proceeds to discuss the concept of measure. Accordingly, he
states that a measure gives us determinate knowledge about the quantity
of something, when it is applied to it. Measuring involves three parties:
the measured object, the intellect and the measure itself; it is done either
in a replicative way, when the measure is smaller than the object it mea-
sures, or in an explicative way, when the object is smaller than the mea-
sure, or in both ways, when the measure and the object are equal. Mea-
sure, as such, can be natural or established by man. All measures must
satisfy six conditions. They must be prior to the mensuratum and better
known. They must be simple, uniform (or regular), independent and of
the same kind iunigena), The final condition is elaborated into a long di-
gression concening the univocity of being, a Scotist doctrine duly sup-
ported by our author. 12
9 lui, f. 90v: «Est mensura durationis, sicut tempus mensurat motum et aeviternitas scilicet
est mensura durationis angelorum et omnium permanentium».
10 Iui, f. 90r-v: «Quarts mensura est instans temporis quod mensurat mutationes instanta-
neas. Unde sicut motus mensuratur tempore, ita mutatum esse mensuratur instanti. Unde solum
mensurat mutata esse vel mutationes subiectivas. Unde non mensurat substantiam nisi ut est sub
mutatione subiectiva vel sub mutate esse. Quinta est instans naturae [...] Per prioritatem naturae
nihil aliud intelligo quam praesuppositionem huius ab hoc in quadam alteritate [...] Sed tamen
passio dicit alteritatem naturae a subiecto, et ideo subiectum praecedit passionem in instanti na-
turae. Sexta autem mensura est instans naturalis intelligentiae et istud mensurat quidditates se-
cundum quod una apta nata est intelligere sine altera, C.'] et ideo si unum praecedat in intellec-
tione est mensura naturalis vel intellectionis, sicut substantia cuius cognitio praecedit cognitio-
nem accidentis, et hoc naturaliter, quamvis propter vires subiectivas prius nobis originetur cogni-
tio accidentis. Septima mensura est mensura privationum et ista respicit principium et
principiatum, ita quod secundum istam principium praecedit principiatum prioritate originis.
Unde bene sequitur: est prioritas paturae, igitur originis, sed non econverso, quia naturae prio-
ritas addit alteritatem in natura; et hoc de isto».
11 lui, f. 90v: «Quintuplex ponitur genus mensurarum per aliquem modum a praedictis.
Primum est mensura perfectionis, secundum causationis, tertium coordinationis, quartum inno-
tescientiae, quintum durationis».
12 Ibidem: «Per quamcumque mensuram accipitur notitia de mensurato. Probatur: per
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The presentation of conditions is followed by conclusions concerning
measure, which partly recapitulate, partly elaborate on the above propo-
sitions. In the first place the author refutes the Boethian contention that
eternity is the measure of God by pointing out that it is impossible, since
eternity is less perfect than God and dependent on it, and therefore can-
not be His measure.P Secondly, he rejects the idea that permanent enti-
ties can be measured by time. He argues here that it is impossible to ac-
cept that time, which is successive, is the measure of something perma-
nent, since the measure and the mensuratum must be proportionate,
and essentially identical, whereas 'successive' and 'permanent' areoppo-
sites. By the same token, permanent being cannot be measured by eter-
nity, which is proper to God alone. The conclusion is drawn to the ex-
treme when our author argues against Thomas Aquinas that even opera-
tions of angels must be measured by a measure corresponding to their
substance, i.e. by aeuum.t" The same mode of thinking is applied else-
quamcumque mensuram intellectus veridice certificatur de mensurato, ut patet inducendo in si-
mul, igitur (etc.) [...] Mensurare nihil aliud est quam aliquid secundum quantitatem minus notam
per accidentiam magis notam certificare et mensurare [...] Mensura nihil aliud est quam intellec-
tus de quantitate rei determinata certitudo [...] Mensura importat respectum triplicem: unum ad
intellectum alium ad rem mensuratam alium ad mensuram [...] Mensura est duplex: quaedam ex
natura, quaedam est mensura nobis. Mensura quae est ex natura est quae est ex natura rei et non
aliqua mensuratione humana. Mensura nobis dicitur quae non mensurat ex natura rei, sed ex in-
stitutione humana [...] Triplex est genus mensurarum in generali, secundum modum triplicem
mensurandi: aliquando aliquid mensuratur replicative, aliquando explicative, aliquando explica-
tive et replicative. Hoc patet. Aliquando mensuratum excedit mensuram, aliquando exceditur.
Similiter aliquando excedit et exceditur. Aliquando aequantur sibi mensura et mensuratum
[...] Condiciones mensurae sunt sex. Prima est quod de ratione mensurae est prioritas [...] Se-
cunda est quod de ratione mensurae est notioritas. Probo, quia illud per quod aliud cognoscitur
notius est quam quod cognoscitur, Sed per mensuram res mensurata cognoscitur, ex secundo
dicto, igitur (etc.) [..,] Tertia condicio est quod de ratione mensurae est simplicitas. Patet, quia
quanto aliquid magis excedit ad sirnplicitatern, tanto magis ad rationem mensurae. Quarta <con-
dicio est> quod de ratione mensurae est unifonnitas vel regularitas. Probo, quia nihil potest regu-
lari per illud quod est irregulare et difforme, sed tantum habet mensurari mensura, igitur (etc.),
Quinta condicio (est) quod de ratione mensurae est independentia. Probatur, quia de ratione
prioris, ut prius, est independentia [..,] Istam tamen independentiam intelligo non absolute,
quod nullo modo dependeat, quia sic nulla tantum est mensura, sed habet intelligere respectu
mensurati. Sexta condicio (est) quod de ratione mensurae est unigenitas. Patet, quia mensura
est unigena mensurato [ ] Etiam sic intendendo non solum secundum rationem analogicam,
[...] sed etiam unitive [ ] Propter quod teneo quod tarn inter Deum et creaturam quam inter
quamcumque aliam mensuram et mensuratum est unitas, seu unigenitas, non solum secundum
rationem analogiae, sed unionis».
13 lvi, f. 91v: «Aeternitas proprie non habet rationem mensurae Dei. Probatur, quia men-
sura habet rationem perfectionis et independentis».
14 Ibidem: «Nulla entitas permanens potest mensurari aliqua mensura successiva formaliter.
Hoc probatur, quia mensura durativa non debet habere motum oppositum suo mensurato. Sed
mensura successiva habet motum oppositum suo mensurato, scilicet enti permanenti, quia sue-
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where when the author argues against the idea that time is established by
proportion of existing being to eternity. IS
The preliminary discussions have shown that for the author of the Phy-
sics questions time, just like aevum and instant (but not eternity), is a mea-
sure, possessing its unique character, essentially identical with the object it
measures and irreducible to any other measure. Now it is time to see what
is its essence, so that we are able to analyse its properties.
The nature of time is the issue that occupies, by far, most space in the
four questions. The author begins with an appropriate, if poignant, quote
from St. Augustine's Confessions: «Lord, up till now I do not know what
the time is!» The following discussion gives an interesting review of two
contemporary Franciscan opinions. He begins with that of Peter Auriol,
his main opponent in many other questions. Peter claims that time is a pure
succession concerning motion or any other numerabilium without any suc-
ceeding object, explaining that since time is formally nothing but prius et
post, which are formally a succession, it is, consequently, a succession. 16
After the opinion of Auriol, fortified by the authority of Augustine and
Aristotle, our author presents the solution given by Landulf of Caracciolo,
who stated that time, as a measure of motion, is successive, continuous
quantity, which is different from that in which prius et post are received."?
cessivum et permanens sunt opposita, cum dicant aliquid commune, igitur (etc). Maior patet, quia
mensura et mensuratum debent proportionari. Item omnis entitas eadem essentialiter cum aliqua
entitate permanente est necessario permanens. Patet, sed mensura durativa et duratio est idem
essentialiter cum quolibet durante, igitur etc. Loo] Sed per durationem res est huiusmodi, quia
quantum res durat, tantum est ens, igitur [00.] tempus non est mensura per se et formaliter alicuius
permanentis [00.] Aevum est mensura cuiuslibet permanentis, ut permanens est. Probatur: nam
aevum, ut dictum est, est mensura cuiuslibet creati et permanentis. Confirmatur, quia non men-
suratur aeternitate. Patet, quia non est ab aeterno et etiam quia aeternitas proprie debetur Deo,
nee etiam tempore, quia tempus est solum mensura successivorum, nec instanti, quia solum tali
(est) mensura durativa per instans. Igitur sequitur quod omnia talia permanentia, ut permanentia
sunt et ut abstrahunt a quiete et motu, aevo mensurantur, tam immaterialia quam materialia, ut
angeli. Sed est dubitatio qua mensura mensurantur operationes angeli. Respondeo: Thomas dicit
quod mensurantur tempore discreto, ponit enim et dicit quod tempus discretum est quoddam ens
de genere quantitatis, constans ex unitatibus sibi invicem succedentibus, ita quod Aristoteles non
facit mentionem de isto tempore, quia posuit substantiam angeli non distingui a sua operatione et
ideo credebat quod eadem mensura mensurarentur substantia et eius operatio».
15 lvi, f. 92v: «Formalis ratio temporis non est simultas sive proportio omnium existentium
ad aeternitatem».
16 lvi, f. SOr: «Est opinio Atireoli, qui ponit quod tempus nihil aliud est quam successio mo-
tus sine motu omnium succedentium. Unde est mora, id est successio motus et omnium nume-
rabilium. Hoc probat. Tempus non est formaliter nisi prius et posterius, terminis actione addita.
Sed prioritas et posterioritas non sunt formaliter aliud quam quaedam successio habens forma-
liter partes priores et posteriores, igitur ete.
17 Ibidem: «Aliter describit tempus frater Landulphus: tempus est quantitas continua sue-
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It is the latter solution that the author of the commentary takes over,
elaborating on it. He notes that time is composed of a material and formal
part; the former part encompasses what is common to all, i.e. quantity or
continuity, the latter is what makes it different from all other things, i.e.
possessing successive parts conjoined by the instant: the past and fu-
ture.l" The concept of 'continuous quantity' forming the material part
of time receives a thorough inspection in a special question within a ques-
tion. In its rationes principales, our author raises an objection to the claim
that time is continuous, pointing out that if time is accepted as a quantity,
it must be divisible and numerable.
In reply to the objections, our author presents an opinion of Peter Aur-
iol, who distinguishes two modes of understanding time resulting from two
modes of understanding quantity. According to the first mode, in which
quantity is seen as non-discrete and indeterminate, time is a continuous
and non-discrete quantity - i.e. a pure succession -like a line or a surface.
According to the other mode, in which quantity is seen as discrete, deter-
minate and measured, time is composed of the continuous and the discrete
- i.e. a number -like a line of certain length or a surface of a certain extent
and, in the case of time, a period of a day or a year. Thus he comes to a
conclusion that the first ratio of measure belongs to discrete quantity
and is only transferred to the continuous and so something can be mea-
sured only when it is analysed as concrete and possessing its proper num-
ber. The conclusion holds for both space and time. As a result, Auriol ac-
cepts that time taken as succession is a continuous priority and posteriority
joined by a common terminus, i.e. the future and the past conjoined by the
present. Secondly, he accepts that everything that includes continuity and
number must be composed of the continuous and the discrete, because
otherwise it would be impossible to estimate the measure. Hence, the dis-
tinction between the material (continuous) and formal (discrete) aspect of
time posed already by Averroes and St. Albert.!"
cessiva, mora motus distincta ab eo in quo signatur prius et posterius, ad mensurandum
motus».
18 Iui, f. 80r.: «In tempore est aliquid materiale et aliquid formale. Est enim species generis
et in qualibet specie est ista reperiri. Materiale igitur in tempore est illud, in quo cum aliis con-
venit, et hoc est quantitas sive continuitas. Formale vero est illud per quod differt ab aliis et hoc
est habere partes successivas ad instans copulatas; hoc enim sibi soli covenit et nulli alii. Ex hiis
igitur duobus possumus sic describere tempus ipsum. Tempus est quantitas continua successivas
habens partes, quae sunt praeteritum et futurum ad instans copulatas».
19 lvi, f. 8Ir-v: «Utrum tempus sit quantitas continua. Quod non sit quantitas continua pro-
batur [...J Dicit Aristoteles quod tempus est quantitas per accidens, quia et per accidens divisi-
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Although the author of our commentary agrees with Auriol in general
that time is, indeed, a continuous quantity, he rejects his particular conclu- .
sion concerning the composite character of time. He raises two objections
against it. Firstly, since a species cannot be characterised by opposing dif-
ferences, it is impossible for time to be characterised by continuity and dis-
cretion, which are opposite. Secondly, what is only an array of parts joined
in a quantitative way, is not intrinsically discrete, therefore time cannot be
said to be discrete.
The reply to these objections reiterates that the opinion that time in-
cludes intrinsically both quantity and discretion is false; it is appropriate
to say, however, that time intrinsically includes continuity and actually -
discretion, which comes from the soul separately perceiving one part of
time after another.i? The author's opinio propria develops the proposition:
bile; divisibilitas enim est passio quantitatis, Item, L..J non sit L..J continua L..], quia est nume-
rus [...] Numerus autem est quantitas discreta. Respondeo: L..J Aureolus L..] ponit duas propo-
sitiones. Prima est ista, quod tempus acceptum per modum quantitatis discretae indeterminatae
est quantitas continua et non discreta. Secunda propositio est ista, quod tempus acceptum per
modum quantitatis discretae, determinatae et mensuratae est quantitas composita ex continua
et discreta. Ad cuius evidentiam praemittit quod duplex est quantitas: quaedam indeterminata,
ut quantitas non reducta ad certum numerum et mensuram, ut dico lineam et superficiem. Est
aliqua quantitas determinata, ut quantitas reducta ad certum numerum et mensuram, ut dico bi-
cubitum et tricubitum, vellineam trium palrnorum vel quattuor, etc. de aliis. Iuxta quod L..]
prima ratio mensurae invenitur in quantitate discreta et transfertur ad continuam et hinc est
quod numquam quantitas potest aliquid mensurare nisi ut reducta ad certum numerum et men-
suram. Sicut linea absolute non dicitur mensurare, sed linea duorum palrnorum vel trium etc.,
quae est reducta ad certum numerum, dicitur mensurare. Similiter dicit de tempore, quod vide-
licet potest sumi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut est quantitas indeterminata, alio modo, ut est quantitas
determinata. Primo modo est absolute ipsa successio adhuc non reducta ad certum numerum vel
mensuram. Secundo modo est quantitas reducta ad certum numerum vel mensuram. Isto modo
tempus est prius et posterius, ut numeratio in motu, vel est ipsa successio sic numerata, et ut
tempus dicitur, sic quantitas numerata dicitur annus vel mensis vel dies. Hoc praernisso proban-
tur praedictae duae propositiones. Et prima probatur sic: tempus, ut est quantitas indeterminata,
non est aliud quam successio; sed successio est quantitas continua. Ipsa enim successio est quae-
dam prioritas et posterioritas continua ad aliquem terminum communem. Est enim futuritio et
praeteritio continuata ad praesens. Confirmatur, quia sicut linea absolute est quantitas indeter-
minata non discreta, cum non includit numerum, sic dico de tempore. Secunda propositio pro-
batur sic. Omne includens continuitatem et numerum est quantitas composita ex continua et di-
screta. Sed tempus, ut est quantitas determinata, est huiusmodi, igitur (etc.), Minor probatur:
quod includit ipsum tempus patet, quia eius partes copulantur ad indivisibile. Quod etiam inclu-
dat numerum et discretionem probatur, quia impossibile (est) quantitatem certificari nee decla-
rari nisi reducatur ad certum numerum. Nam impossibile est de linea certificari quanta sit nisi ut
sit reducta, ut dicam, ad lineam duorum palrnorum. Similiter impossibile est concipere numerum
quod est quantitas determinata nisi reducendo ad certum numerum et mensuram, et sic de aliis.
Et haec est intentio plana commentorum Alberti, quarto Physicorum 34 commento, qui ponit
tempus componi ex continuitate tamquam ex materiali et ex discretione tamquam ex formali».
20 lvi, f. 81v: «Contra istam opinionem arguitur. Impossibile est alicui speciei alicuius gene-
ris inesse duas clifferentias oppositas illius generis distinctas. Sed continuitas et discretio sunt dif-
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«Time is a continuous quantity», saying that both characteristics, i.e. quan-
tity and continuity, apply to it of itself. On one hand, it is a quantity of it-
self, because it has 'parts beyond parts', namely the past and the future, by
its nature; it has an extension, which is a proper attribute of quantity; final-
ly, it is a measure, which is a ratio of quantity. On the other hand, it is con-
tinuous of itself, because its parts are conjoined to a common terminus in-
trinsically. He concedes that even though time is quantitative formally and
of itself, it may be treated as quantity per accidens causally, i.e. as a result,
because its quantity is contracted by something else, just like music is an
accidental being causally, as a result of something else, yet it is formally
a being in itself" It is worth noting that speaking of time as a continuous
quantity, the author remembers to remind the reader that continuity is dif-
ferent in permanent and successive beings: though in both cases it requires
that the parts are intrinsically conjoined to something indivisible, in perma-
nent beings all parts must exist at the same time (like parts of the line),
whereas in successive ones this condition is unnecessary.F
ferentiae quantitatem dividentes, ut patet in Praedicamentis, igitur (etc.), Item, nulla entitas, quae
habet esse praecise per quantitatem et copulationem unius partis cum aliqua, est intrinsece di-
screta. Sed tempus habet esse huiusmodi, igitur (etc.). Maior patet, quia si aliquod oppositum
est causa esse alicuius, ita quod per illud esse praecise habet aliud oppositum, sibi repugnat et
est causa sui non esse [...] Confirmatur: nullum essentialiter discretum est essentialiter non di-
scretum. Sed omne essentialiter continuum est essentialiter non discretum, quia omne continuum
dicit impraecisionem et indivisionem, cum continuitas sit quaedam unitas. [...] Si igitur ista opi-
nio intelligat quod tempori intrinsece inest quantitas et discretio, credo quod est falsa. L..] Si au-
tern intelligeret quod continuitas sibi sit intrinseca et discretio actualis, in qua videlicet anima in-
telligit unam partem, ut est praecisa ab alia, sic bene concedo».
21 lvi, f. 81v-82r: «Tempus est per se quantitas. Probatur sic: omne quod per se ex natura sua
habet partem extra partem est per se quantitas; tempus est huiusmodi, igitur (etc.). Minor patet,
quia praeteritum et futurum sunt partes temp oris per se, quia nulli alii conveniunt L..] Propter
quod illud quod habet extensionem propriam, habet propriam quantitatem, cum extensio sit pas-
sio quantitatis. Sed tempus habet propriam extensionem, aliam ab extensione spatii simpliciter
[...] Item, cui conveniunt passiones quantitatis proprie et per se et proprissima ratio quantitatis,
idem tale 'per se est quantitas; tempus est huiusmodi, igitur (etc.), Patet minor per longum et
breve, quia per se competunt tempori. Similiter ratio mensurae quantitativae, quae est ratio pro-
pria quantitatis, igitur (etc.). Secunda propositio est ista quod tempus est per se quantitas conti-
nua. Probatur: cuiuscumque partes intrinsece copulantur ad aliquem terminum communem, est
per se (quantitas) continua; tempus habet esse huiusmodi, igitur (etc.) L.'] Ad aliud dico quod
tempus est quantum per accidens causaliter quia suam quantitatem contrahit ab alio; formaliter
autem est per se quantum. Musica etiam est ens per accidens causaliter, quia est ab alio; formaliter
autem est ens per se. Ad aliud dico quod numerus motus est vere mensura».
22 lvi, f. 80v: «Natura cuiuslibet continui sive permanentis sive successivi in hoc stat, quod
eius partes ad aliquod indivisibile intrinsece copulantur propter quod habent unitatem et conti-
nuitatem, quo facto in actu praeciso ipsam ultimam non habent continuitatem. Hoc patet: duae
enim partes lineae copulantur ad punctum quo praeciso vel facto in actu iam essent (puncta) di-
scontinua L..] Permanentia inquantum ad eorum actualem existentiam requirunt omnes partes
actualiter existentes, ut simul sunt; non sic successiva, sed sufficit quod eorum partes sint ad ali-
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The description of time as continuous quantity is repeated several
times in all four questions and its analyses are summed up in the final
one. The author presents there a number of propositions, which he calls
communia. They can be divided into three parts. The first deals with the
proper attributes of time: it is stated there that successive continuity of
time is intrinsic and essential to it and that it is not identical with the con-
tinuity of motion or magnitude. The second group includes statements
concerning the structure of time and here we learn that it is composed
of formal and material parts and, according to another division, it includes
prius et post. The third group contains propositions concerning the func-
tion of time as a measure: it is said to be a natural measure, which, as such,
exceeds all temporal things, measuring them in an explicative way. 23
All of the theses are duly argued for but only some of them merit a
mention as adding something new to the explanations already given else-
where. Our author maintains that continuity must be an essential property
of time, since it cannot exist without it, which would not be the case, if
continuity were merely accidental to it. Continuity of time cannot be iden-
tical with those of motion and magnitude, because those that are continued
in either of them are different from one another, being 'now' (nunc), mu-
tatum esse, and point, respectively. This continuity is essentially successive,
because it refers to successive rather than permanent quantity. As for the
formal part of time, our author confesses that it is unknown to us but can
be circumscribed by saying that time's/ormalis ratio consists in having suc-
cessive parts conjoined with the present. The material part of time is, natu-
rally, the quantity. Prius et post must be intrinsic parts of time, because it is
essentially ordered according to them. Finally, since time as a measure ex-
ceeds all temporal things, it is obvious that it can measure them only in an
explicative way. If, however, it is only one part of time that is going to serve
as a measure, it can be exceeded by the measured object and, conse-
quently, measure it in a replicative way.?"
quod indivisibile copulatae et ex connexione ad illud habent eorum partes existentiam, non enim
requirunt simul eorum partes existere»,
23 lvi, f. 92r: «Sunt accipienda communia quae sunt decem. Primum est: tempus est quan-
titas quaedam. Secundum est quod est continua quantitas. Tertium est: continuitas est sibi intrin-
seca et essentialis. Quartum (est) quod continuitas eius non est continuitas motus nee magnitu-
dinis. Quintum (est) quod tempus est quid continuum continuitate successiva. Sextum (est) quod
tempus includit aliquid formale et aliquid materiale. Septimum (est) quod tempus includit prius
et post. Octavum (est) quod tempus est mensura ex natura rei. Nonum (est) quod tempus exce-
dit quodcumque temporale. Decimum (est) quod tempus acceptum secundum suam rationem
mensurat solum modo explicativo modo».
24 lvi, f. 92r-v: «Quod ipsa continuitas non sit accidentalis tempori, patet per hoc quod per
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Once we have established what is understood by 'time' in the Quaes-
tiones super libros Physicorum we can proceed to the particular problems
concerning time raised by its author. These include three large issues:
the relation between time and instant, time and motion and, finally, time
and soul. As it can be seen from the very titles of the questions, the author
himself gives prominence to those problems and though certain solutions
and arguments are repeated elsewhere, they are mostly addressed in those
specially dedicated questions.
The problem of instant lies at the heart of understanding time. It has
been said that our author accepts the Aristotelian concept of time, defined
as past and future parts conjoined by the indivisible, which is an instant.
What must be seen then is the nature of instant itself. The author of the
commentary approaches the question in a familiar way, by allowing his op-
ponent to speak first. The position of the opponent is occupied, once
again, by Peter Auriol.
The starting point of the discussion is the opinion of Aristotle; which -
as attested by our author - is accepted by everyone. According to it, in-
stant, or 'now' remains substantially the same within all time but is differ-
ent with respect to ever changing existence (esse) and with respect to ratio.
Auriol then presents three propositions. Firstly, the flow of 'now' is the
cause of time, remaining substantially the same but existentially different
throughout the flow. Secondly, 'now' follows that which it is carried by,
i.e. motion. Thirdly, 'now' is what discontinues time and is its terminus
when in act but continues it when in potency, just like a point, which con-
quamcumque potentiam ipsum tempus non videtur posse existere sine ipsa L..] Continuitates
quarum continuativa sunt alterius et alterius rationis sunt alterius rationis. Sed continuitates mo-
tus, magnitudinis et temporis sunt huiusmodi, igitur (etc.), Maior patet, sed minor probatur, quia
continuitas tantum magnitudinis est punctus, motus mutatum esse, temporis autem nunc [...]
Quod etiam (terrnporis) successio sit sibi intrinseca et essentialis patet, quia sicut se habet per-
manentia ad quantitem permanentem, sic successio ad quantitatem successivam L..] Forma seu
ratio formalis ipsius est nobis ignota, possumus tamen ipsam circumloqui, L..] ita quod dicamus
quod formalis ratio temp oris est habere partes successivas ad instans seu ad nunc copulatas. Hoc
autem potest ostendi. mud videtur esse formalis ratio et propria alicuius quod intrinsece sibi soli
convenit. Hoc autem est habere huiusmodi partes successivas sic ad nunc copulatas respectu
temporis, igitur hoc est sibi formale et per hoc ab omnibus distinguitur. Materiale autem in
eo est istud in quo cum aliis convenit, ut quantitas L..J mud, cuius partes intrinsece essentialiter
ordinantur secundum prius et post, includit prius et post. Sed temporis partes sunt huiusmodi,
quod scilicet isto modo ordinantur, igitur (etc.) L..] Tempus acceptum secundum rationem suam
mensurat solum modo modo explicativo. Patet, quia mensura, quae semper excedit suum men-
suratum, non mensurat ipsum nisi modo explicativo. Huiusmodi est tempus secundum rationem
suam respectu rei temporalis, igitur (etc.). Dico tamen quod tempus acceptum secundum ratio-
nem suam, quia si accipiatur secundum aliquam sui partem, tamen bene potest excedi a mensu-
rato vel sibi adaequare, et ita est mensurare ipsum modo replicativo».
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tinues a line when in potency but terminates n ill act. The conclusion
drawn by Auriol is that time does not exist beyond the soul. 25
The author of the Physics questions rejects Auriol's conclusion (we
shall discuss his reasons for it below) and, consequently, refutes the pro-
positions it is derived from. He says that 'now', as an indivisible, cannot
move, let alone flow, because flow presupposes succession that involves
divisibles rather than indivisibles. It cannot be a cause of time, since it
is neither formal nor material, final or effective one, and there are no
other types of causes. What is more, if it were the cause of time, it would
mean that indivisible instant would be adequate to divisible time, which is
impossible.r"
The solution, which follows, is composed of two parts. In the first one
the author argues for the opinion that instant does not remain substantially
the same in all time; the other part is a defence against the opinion con-
cluding that if an instant does not remain the same, it must perish. The ar-
guments for the proposition are of triple character. The first one is drawn
from Aristotle's statements that there is time between any two instants but
no indivisible can be split by something divisible, e.g. time. Consequently,
it is impossible for the instants separated by time to be substantially iden-
tical. The second shows that if one takes two parts of time, i.e. the past and
the future, and an instant that continues through them, it can be seen that
the instant must pass away together with the part of time it is in, otherwise
25 lvi, f. 83v: «Primum dictum Aristotelis est istud quod attribuit nunc, quod proprium est
nunc quod sit idem in toto tempore secundum substantiam et subiectum differens penes aliud et
aliud esse et secundum rationem [...] Nunc fluens causat tempus et est idem in toto £luxu secun-
dum substantiam, differens secundum esse L..] Nunc sequirur illud quod fertur. Sed tempus se-
quitur ipsum motum et sicut mobile est idem in toto motu secundum substantiam, non secun-
dum esse, sic et nunc vel instans [...] Nunc, ut discontinuat tempus, est in actu et est terminus
ipsius, sicut punctus factus in actu discontinuat ipsam (lineam) et est terminus; et sicut punctus in
potentia continuat ipsam (lineam), sic nunc in potentia continuat ipsum tempus. Hoc praemisso
dedarat positionem suam. Ad evidentiam est sciendum quod tempus non habet esse praeter ani-
mam; hoc enim dato, ut dicit, incovenientia quae adducuntur contra istam condusionem, quae
est Aristotelis, condudent».
26 lvi, f. 84r: «Contra etiam quod dicit instans fluere arguitur, quia indivisibile non potest
fluere, nee etiam moveri, sexto huius. Item, si instans esset causa temporis, quaero in quo ge-
nere esse. Non esse materiale, quia tunc esset subiectum tempus temporis; indivisibile autem
non est subiectum divisibilitatis. Non formale, certum est, quia instans non est forma temporis,
sicut nec forma puncti est linea. Nee finale (quod) patet, nec efficiens, quia idem est subiectum
passionis et efficiens L.'] Instans non potest esse subiectum £luxus, [...] quia £luxus dicit sue-
cessionem et divisibilitatem; nullum autem indivisibile est subiectum divisibilis L..] Item, si in-
stans per suum £luxum causaret tempus, tunc sequeretur quod adaequaretur toti tempori; aliter
aliqua pars esset temporis, quae non esset causata per £luxum, ete. Sed indivisibile non potest
adaequari indivisibili».
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one would have to admit that the substance of an instant can pass from one
subject to another, which is impossible. The third one is based on parallel
between an instant, mutatum esse and a point in a line. Aristotle shows that
neither mutatum esse nor a point remain substantially one, as is clear from
an example with a point on a section of a line, which must perish lest it
were divided into two. Moreover, if the instant or 'now' remained the same
throughout the time, it would mean that many successive mutata esse take
place at the same time, which is impossible, especially that every mutatum
esse in motion corresponds to its instant in time."
The arguments raised against our author's proposition that instant can-
not remain substantially identical in all time point to a very important pro-
blem. If an instant perishes, it must perish at some point. It cannot perish
in the same instant it exists, because then it would be and not be at the
same time, which is impossible. It cannot perish in a preceding instant, be-
cause then it would perish before it came into being. It cannot perish in a
following instant, no matter whether is immediate or mediate. The former
option is impossible, because according to Aristotle instants are not im-
mediate to one another; the latter is also impossible, for if we posit an in-
tervening time between two instants (no matter how short), it contains in-
finite instants, and so a destruction of one instant would come after an in-
finite number of other instants."
27 Ioi, f. 84r: «Ostendo quod non sit idem instans secundum substantiam in toto tempore.
Primo sic: impossibile est quod inter aliquam entitatem secundum substantiam simpliciter indi-
visibilem mediet aliqua entitas divisibilis. Sed inter quaecumque duo instantia in tempore, secun-
dum doctrinam Aristotelis in sexto (huius), cadit tempus, igitur impossibile est quod substantia
huius instantis et illius sit una impartibiliter [...] Confirmatur: accipio duo instantia inter quae
clauditur aliqua pars temporis, tunc vel substantia istius instantis est substantia illius vel non,
vel alia. Si alia, habetur propositum [...] Item, accipio duas partes temporis, puta praeteritum
et futurum, et accipio instans quod continuat istas duas partes. Nunc quaero aut substantia huius
instantis transeunte ista parte et adveniente alia, puta quando pars futura transit in praeteritum,
quaero an tale instans secundum substantiam eius corrumpitur vel remanet. Si dicatur quod sub-
stantia eius transit et deficit sicut pars et pars quam copulat, habeo propositum. Si dicatur quod
substantia eius non desinit, igitur sequitur quod transeat de subiecto ad subiectum et de maiori
parte temporis ad aliam partem. Sed hoc est manifeste impossibile, igitur etc. Item, sicut se habet
mutatum esse ad motum et punctus ad lineam, ita se habet instans ad tempus. Ista est propositio
Aristotelis. Sed mutatum esse in motu et punctus in linea non sunt secundum substantiam unum,
igitur nee per consequens instantia in tempore. Minor patet: de punctis enim in linea satis est
clarum. Nam uno puncto corrupto alia possunt remanere. Quando enim duae partes lineae fiunt
in actu, iste punctus qui recopulabat corruptus est, aliter esset in duo divisus, et sunt duo de novo
producti [...] Item, sequitur quod plura essent simul. Probatio: nam cuilibet mutato esse in motu
correspondet suum nunc in tempore. Per te autern manet idem nunc in toto tempore secundum
substantiam, igitur et omnia mutata esse in motu sunt in eodem nunc, ex quo sequitur quod
plura nunc correspondentia pluribus mutatis esse erunt simul. Hoc est impossibile, igitur (etc.)».
28 Ioi, f. 84r-v: «Sed contra istam (opinionern) arguitur per rationem Aristotelis, Si instans
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The author of the questions treats these objections seriously and is
swift to admit that neither instant nor mutatum esse perishes. He remarks
that some authors (aliqui) claim that an instant does not come to being or
perish in the proper sense but instead it begins and ends iincipit et desi-
nit). The solution he himself favours is still different. According to our
author, to say that instant or mutatum esse does not perish in time is tan-
tamount to saying that time is not a measure of their destruction and this,
as such, is true. He prefers, however, to use the term 'pass' (cedere). In-
stant and mutatum esse pass when time passes at something indivisible. A
present instant passes by becoming past but something does not become
past only because an indivisible passed into something else. An instant
passes only at the end of a process that involves something divisible.
The fact that there is a process does not mean that we can speak of an
instant passing part by part, because it is indivisible, but that it always
accompanies the end of a period. Accordingly, it is impossible to speak
of the first instant of passing.i?
Throughout the discussion concerning the destruction of instant, our
author maintained its indivisibility. Indeed, in his characteristic of it he
non manet unum secundum substantiam, tunc corrumperetur. Consequens est falsum, igitur et
antecedens. Falsitas consequentis probatur, quia vel corrumperetur in se ipso, et hoc non, quia
tunc simul esset et non esset; vel in aliquo instanti, et hoc modo non, quia vel corrumperetur in
praecedente vel in sequente. Non in praecedente, quia corrumperetur antequam esset; nec in se-
quente, quia vel in mediato vel in immediato. Non in rnediato, quia sic non est immediatum in
instanti, nee in immediato, quia inter talia instantia cadit tempus medium, et cum in quocumque
tempore sunt infinita instantia, igitur per consequens illud instans non posset corrurnpi, quoniam
corrumperentur infinita instantia, quod est falsum, igitur etc. Item, aut corrumpitur quando est,
aut quando non est. Non quando non est, quia tunc simul haberet esse et non esse, et quando est
incipit esse, ergo quando habet esse incipit esse, quia illud quod nunquam fuit nee in toto tem-
pore praeterito fuit incipit esse. Sed sic non fuit, igitur per consequens incipit esse; ergo quando
habet esse incipit esse. Sed quod incipit esse non desinit esse, cum sint opposita, igitur quando
est, non desinit esse (seu corrumpitur), nec quando non est, quia quando est, corruptum est, igi-
tur (etc.)»,
29 lvi, f. 84v: «Ad primum dicunt aliqui quod instans proprie non corrumpitur nee genera-
tur, quia omnis generatio vel corruptio mensuratur aliqua mensura. Verumtamen potest bene de-
sinere vel incipere. In plus enim se habet inceptio quam generatio [...J Et ideo dico aliter, quod
instans vel mutatum esse non corrumpitur in tempore, non sic intelligendo quod sit tempus men-
sura corruptionis eorurn, sed quia cedunt ad cessationem temporis et alicuius indivisibilis. Indi-
visibile enim non cadit nisi per cessionem alicuius divisibilis. Unde instans nunc praesens non
cedit nisi per hoc, quod sit praeteritum. Non autem sit praeteritum per solam cessionem indivi-
sibilis [...] Ista igitur propositio est necessario concedenda, quia omne indivisibile cedat divisibili,
non sic quod una eius pars primo cedat primo et postea alia, cum sit indivisibile, sed quia non
cedit nisi ad cessionem alicuius divisibilis [...] Non sequitur igitur cessum esse est divisibile, quia
si ad cessionem alicuius divisibilis, igitur quia quando cessum est, non est. Sed bene concedo
quod cessum est est divisibile, nee contingit dare primum instans, nee primam partem temporis
in quo cessum sit. Sicut non contingit dare primum instans, nee primam partem motus, nee pri-
mum instans post terminum a quo, ut probatur sexto huius».
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states that it is repugnant to divisibility into signa realia and thus it is im-
possible to assign priority or posteriority to it. On the other hand, he con-
cedes that what is impossible really, is possible secundum rationem. What
is more, in the same instant of time one can assign not only many signa
rationis but also signa naturalia, introducing order of priority. Our author
assures his readers, however, that it does not bring about any contradic-
tion.?" The analysis of properties of instant is closed with an answer to
the most important question concerning its ontological status. The author
of the commentary rejects here the twofold division into substance and ac-
cident, saying that instant is a certain reality, which is neither of the twO.31
Having established the characteristic of instant our author proceeds
into the discussion of its relation to time. Instant is said to be actually in
time. Its actuality is called 'present' (actualitas praesentis) to stress that only
the present instant exists actually, all other ones being either past or fu-
ture.V The fact that instant, understood as the present, actually exists in
time does mean, however, that it is its part. On the contrary, the author
of the questions argues that it cannot be a part of time, for all parts of time
are divisible, since time is divisible in proportion to the division of space.P
30 lvi, f. 84v-85r: «Impossibile est in eodem instanti assignare realiter alteritatem prioritatis
et posterioritatis. Probatur: in simplici indivisibili non potest assignari alteritas prioritatis et po-
sterioritatis. Sed instans est simpliciter indivisibile, igitur ete. Maior patet, quia ubi est prius et
post, ibi plura, et per consequens divisibilitas [..,] In instanti potest assignari alteritas prioritatis
et posterioritatis secundum rationem. Hoc probatur, quia illud instans est principium unius par-
tis temporis et finis alterius. Sed principium et finis dicunt alteritatem prioritatis et posterioritatis,
igitur (etc.) [..,] Instans non est divisibile in plura signa realia. Probatur: nam tunc instans esset
divisibile et quodlibet istorum signorum esset instans et sic unum instans esset plura instantia,
quorum utrum est falsum [..,] In eadem instanti possunt assignari plura signa rationis. Probatur,
quia idem instans est principium et finis, turn quia in eodem instanti temporis sunt plura signa
naturae et cum simultate instantis temp oris stat prioritas secundum naturam, quod patet, quia
propria passio est in eodem instanti temporis cum suo subiecto, et tamen est post natura etc.
Sextum dictum est istud quod ista alteritas prioritatis et posterioritatis secundum rationem
non ponitur contradictoria, de eodem posset verificari in eodem instanti temporis. Probatur: im-
possibile est quod in eadem mensura realiter indivisibili aliquid sit et non sit. Sed instans est rea-
Iiter indivisibile, igitur (etc.)».
31 lvi, f. 85r: «Ista divisio non est immediata proprie loquendo de substantia et accidente;
de multis enim oportet dicere quod nee substantia nee accidens potest essentialiter praedicari de
ipsis, nec de multis differentiis et de multis aliis. Ista igitur divisio non est immediata sed bene
ista: omne quod est vel est substantia vel accidens vel aliqua realitas huius vel illius».
32 lvi, f. 85r-v: «Triplex est actualitas: quaedam separationis, ut illud indivisibile dicatur
actu sic quod habeat esse separaturn in tempore, et illo modo est impossibile; alia est actualitas
actualis terminationis, ut illud indivisibile dicitur esse actu, quia actu terminat illud cuius est, ut
puncta extrema in linea dicuntur esse actu ista actualitate. Instans autem continuans partem prae-
teritam cum futura est solum praesentis; alia vero transierunt, ut quae sunt in praeterito, vel sunt
transeunda, ut quae sunt in futuro».
33 lvi, f. 85v: «Praesens nullo modo est pars temporis. Probatur: omnis pars temporis habet
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And when it is said that it is owing to the present, which conjoins the past
and the future, there is time, the author replies that this is no wonder: a
man is called crisp-haired because his head is covered with crisp hair, even
though head is not the whole man." It is clear then that the present, or
'now' is nothing but an indivisible, or instant, conjoining the past and
the future.P
The second large issue concerning time in relation to other things is fo-
cused on motion. It is interesting to observe how hard the author of the
Questiones tries to maintain the precise distinction between time and mo-
tion, even though he acknowledges their mutual relations. It has already
been said of time that we can call it present, although it is entirely com-
posed of past and future parts. According to our author this is because
the parts continually follow one another until a present state (mutatum
esse) in such a way, that each part of time corresponds to a proportional
part of rnotion:" The continuity of time, however, is different from that
of motion, not because motion does not share the same characteristics,
but because time and motion have different objects of continuation: in
the former case, it is the instant, in the latter, the mutatum esse.37
partes. Sed praesens non habet partes, igitur (etc.). Minor probatur: cuiuslibet successivi habentis
partes una pars succedit alteri et una est ante aliarn, et una facta antequam alia. Sed praesenti non
potest assignari quod una pars succedit aliae, et quod una pars sit ante facta, igitur (etc.) [...]
Sequitur igitur quod praesens non sit pars temporis, quod est ens successivum. Item, tempus di-
viditur ad divisionern spatii, sexto huius. Sed in spatia semper una pars est prior, alia posterior, et
post quamlibet pattern est alia pars, et una est extra aliam, quia omne continuum habet pattern
extra pattern, igitur in tempore omnis pars vel esset prior vel posterior. Sed hoc non potest assi-
gnari de praesenti, quia quod prius est factum non est praesentialiter factum, igitur sequitur quod
praesens non est pars temporis».
34 Iui, f. 80v: «Licet in instanti non sit tempus, nee pars temporis per existentiarn, tarnen
instans actuale tempus dicitur in actu. Unde non sequitur ad hoc, quod sit tempus nisi aliquid
indivisibile continens pattern priorem cum posteriori. Declaratur exemplo: licet enim caput ho-
minis non sit homo, tarnen totus homo denominatur crispus, ex hoc quod crispitudo informat
caput. Ex quibus patet declaratio entitatis temporis».
35 Iui, f. 85v: «Ipsum praesens non est aliquid nisi ipsum indivisibile vel ipsum nunc vel
ipsum instans continuans pattern praeteritarn cum futura. Probatur: quodcumque dicitur esse
praesens, dicitur esse nunc, et econverso, igitur nunc et praesens idem sunt. Sed nunc est indi-
visibile copulans (pattern) praeteritarn cum futura, igitur et praesens».
36 Ioi, f. 86r: «Sicut fuit dictum de tempore, quod quaelibet eius pars sit facta et fienda,
ipsum tarnen tempus dicitur esse praesens per actualem continuationem unius partis cum alia
ad mutatum esse praesens, ita quod cuilibet parti temporis correspondet proportionaliter pars
motus, ita quod parti praeterirae correspondeat pars facta in motu et futurae fienda etc., requi-
ritur quod sicut fuit actualis continuatio in tempore unius partis cum alia, ita etiarn in motu fit
actualis continuatio».
37 Iui, f. 80r: «Un de continuitas motus est alia a continuitate temporis. Probatur: continui-
tas, cuius continuatum est alterius rationis, ipsa est alterius rationis, Sed continuatum temporis et
motus sunt alterius rationis, quia (sunt) instans et mutatum esse».
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It is not only the continuity of time and motion that differ. In two se-
parate places in the questions the author produces lists of propositions
dealing with differences and similarities between the two. From the first
one, we can learn that time that is in the motion of the primum mobile
is really different from the inferior motions it is the measure of. On the
other hand, if one compares all time and all motion of the primum mobile,
time is not really different from the motion in which it is subjectively. The
same is true for spatial time and motions. The author argues that since it is
impossible for motion to exist without time, even by the power of God,
they cannot be really different. To the objection saying that there is a real
relation between time and motion (se. that of measuring) and the extremes
of a real relation must be really different our author replies that this rela-
tion involves time in general and particular motions, and those are, indeed,
really different. Finally, time is formally different from motion, just like an
attribute is different from its subject. It can be called an attribute of motion
because it adds to it an aptitude allowing it to be measured in the same way
as risibility allows man to smile. Materially, time and motion remain the
same.:"
38 lvi, f. 82r: «Tempus quod est in motu primi mobilis subiective distinguitur realiter a mo-
tibus inferioribus quos mensurat. Haec (propositio) probatur sic: quaecumque sunt praecisibilia
ad invicem, non sunt idem realiter. Sed tempus primum et motus inferiores sunt huiusmodi, igi-
tur etc. Minor probatur, quia si nullus esset motus hie inferius adhuc posset coelum moveri, et
per consequens tempus esset similiter cessante motu primi mobilis, et per consequens esset tem-
pus, etsi nullus motus esset hie inferius, ut probatum est supra. Item, quaecumque duo accidentia
sunt in distinctis subiectis, ilia sunt distincta realiter. Tempus primi mobilis et motus inferiores
sunt huiusmodi, igitur (etc.) [...] Comparando totum tempus ad totum motum primi mobilis,
tempus primum non distinguitur realiter a motu in quo est subiective. Similiter tempus spatiale
non distinguitur realiter a motu in quo est. Probatur: omne absolutum prius natura alio distinc-
tum realiter ab ilIo potest per potentiam Dei separari ab ilIo. Ista patet infa1libiliter. Deus enim
potest separare quaecumque absoluta non dependentia, quare enim Deus non potest ista sepa-
rare duo? Hoc est propoter dependentiam ad invicem vel propter eorum identitatem realem. Sed
impossibile est per aliquam potentiam motum esse sine tempore. Hoc patet, quia non potest esse
motus quin sit prius et posterius et alia pars praeterita et alia futura. Haec autem sunt ipsum tem-
pus, igitur (etc.), Praeterea, tempus est passio motus, passio autem non distinguitur a subiecto, ut
suppono et probatum fuit in primo libro, igitur (etc.) L..] Contra [...] Quaecumque ad invicem
referuntur relatione reali, ilia talia non sunt idem realiter, quia relatio realis requirit duo extrema
realiter, quia relativa sunt quorum esse ad aliud realiter refertur. Sed tempus et motus sunt huiu-
smodi. Patet, quia se habent sicut mensura et mensuratum. Confirmatur: idem ad se non refertur
ratione reali, quinto Metapbysicae. Item, cuiuscumque partes continuantur ad aliquem terminum
essentialiter, habent essentialiter aliam et aliam continuitatem, et per consequens eius quantitas
est essentialiter distincta. Sed mutatum esse, ad quod copulantur partes motus, et instans non
sunt idem essentialiter, igitur (etc.). Respondeo. Ad primum dico quod mensura extrinseca refer-
tur realiter ad mensuratum, et sic comparando tempus commune ad motus inferiores, sic ipsa
distinguuntur realiter. Ad confirmationem per idem. Ad secundum dico quod nunc et mutatum
esse omnino sunt idem essentialiter, distincta tamen ex natura rei [...] (Tempus) distinguitur for-
maliter a motu. Patet, quia passio distinguitur formaliter a subiecto, igitur (etc.). Unde tempus
- 179-
MAREK GENSLER
The second list of propositions is but a sketch, yet it must be noted,
because some of them seem to contradict the ones from the earlier list.
It is said there that time is not really identical with the motion of primum
mobile, or motion taken in general; furthermore, it is neither the continua-
tion of motion nor its essential quantity. The latter two propositions go
well in line with what has been said so far. Not so with the first couple.
As for the first proposition, the author argues that though there cannot
be many times, there can be many worlds and, consequently, many motions
of the primum mobile. As for the second, he argues that if the two were
really the same, then time could not exist without motion; moreover, the
quantity of motion would have to be commensurate with the quantity of
time, which is not the case, since there can be a greater motion in a smaller
time and vice versa"
These apparent aporiae induce us to pose a question whether time can
exist without motion. The questions provide us with an answer. Our
author staunchly rejects the idea that time can precede motion, saying that
it is contrary to both theological authority (impersonated by St. Augustine
and Venerable Bede) and reason, since time, which is not a substance,
must exist in motion as its subject. Consequently, there will be no time
if all motion ceases. Moreover, time is what follows (est sequela) motion,
because it is successive, and everything that is successive is funded on mo-
tion. Besides, as a measure of motion, it must be proportionate to it and
uniform (unigenum) with it. The argument that time also measures rest
is worthless, since rest is measured per accidens in proportion to motion. 40
addit aliquid supra morum, scilicet respectum aptibilem, sicut risibile addit respecrum aptibilem
supra hominem. Unde sicut homini accidit quod actu rideat, ita accidit motui quod actu nume-
ratur; addit igitur tempus supra motum numerabilitatem. Tempus igitur et motus sunt idem ma-
terialiter, form aliter tamen distincta».
39 lvi, f. 92v-93r: «Tempus non est idem realiter quod motus primi mobilis; L.'] tempus non
est realiter quod motus generaliter; [...] tempus non est continuatio motus; [...] tempus non est
quantitas essentialis motus [...] Primum sic probo. Quaelibet pars temporis est tempus. Sed
non quaelibet pars circulationis est circulatio, igitur tempus non idem est quod ipsa prima circu-
latio. Praeterea, possibile est plures primas circulationes esse simul. Sed secundum Philosophum
octavo Pbysicorum, capitulo decimo, non possunt esse plura tempora, igitur non est idem tempus
cum ipsis. Antecedens patet, quia possibile est fieri plures mundos L.'] Secundum, quod tempus
non erit idem realiter quod motus generaliter sumptus: nam motus est solum modo in mobili rea-
liter. Sed tempus non est solurn modo in ilio, sed etiam in quacumque re alia temporali, igitur
ipsum non est idem quod motus. Si enim esset idem, non posset esse nisi ipse motus esset [...]
Praeterea, si tempus et motus realiter essent idem, quantitate motus cornmensuraretur quantitas
temporis. Con sequens est falsum, igitur iliud ex (quo) sequitur. Consequentia tenet. Sed falsitas
consequentis probatur, quia maior motus potest fieri in minori tempore, et minor in rnaiori».
40 Iui, f. 82v: «Contra primam conclusionem, quod tempus non sit ab aeterno, per Augu-
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In this way, we arrive at a conclusion: time is twofold in character. On
the one hand, it common and general, corresponding to the motion of the
primum mobile; this time measures the motion of the primum mobile by
inherence and all other motions, as an assisting measure. On the other
hand, time can be particular or spatial, i.e. of limited duration; this time
is inherent to particular motions. Thus, it can be said that there is only
one time, which is an extrinsic measureof all temporal beings; this is time
in the general sense, which cannot be multiplied but is first in the genus.
What can be multiplied is the particular time, corresponding to particular
motions, each of which must have its inherent time being its measure. Fol-
lowing St. Augustine our author notes here that such particular time can
last even after cessation of the motion of the primum mobile. He adds that
by the power of God, there could be separate motions with their separate
times."!
stinum et Bedam et ornnes Super Genesim, qui ad litteram ponunt fuisse productum ab initio
mundi. Unde ponunt simul quattuor creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, coelum empireum, pri-
mam materiam et tempus. Praeterea, per te ab aeterno fuit tempus, igitur ab aeterno aliquod su-
biectum habuit. Sed Deus non fuit, quia non est subiectum accidentis, igitur ab aeterno fuit ali-
qua creatura, quae fuit subiectum temporis. Sed hoc est contra veritatem L..] et fidem, igitur
(etc.). Nee videtur, salva sua reverentia, secundum veritatem ornne dictum, quod tempus nihil
habet pro subiecto, [...] sed est quoddam consequens ipsum motum vel sequela. Nam omne
ens vel est ens per se, vel in alio. Tempus non est per se ens, cum non sit substantia, igitur
est in alio L..] Ratio, quia tempus inest omni motui et soli et semper, ut patet (per) Philosophum.
Quod etiam sequela sit motus, probatur. Omnis mensura successiva est consecutio entis forma-
liter successivi. Sed omne successivum est motus vel fundatur in motu, quod dico propter actio-
nem et passionem, igitur (etc.). Maior patet, quia nullum successivum potest mensurare ens per-
manens. Ista (propositio) patet, quia mensura et mensuratum debent esse unigena et debent
etiam proportionari, cuiusmodi non sunt permanens et successivum. Dico igitur, quod cessante
omni motu non esset tempus positive nisi solum privative L..] Quo modo per accidens (aliquid)
tempore mensuratur? Hoc igitur imaginor sic, quia eo quod tantus motus posset fieri in tanto
tempore, ideo pro hoc quod aufertur motus per tantum tempus secundum mensuram motus,
quae posset fieri in toto tempore indicamus totam quantitatem esse quietis et dicimus quietem
durare per unum diem, quia igitur motum ilium; sic etiam mensuratur per se ideo et quies, cuius
quantitas indicatur ex motus quantitate, qui posset fieri in tanto tempore, dicitur mensurari tanto
tempore, et hoc est per accidens».
41 lvi, f. 81r: «Duplex est tempus: quoddam commune et generale, cuiuscumque motus
particularis per assistentiam mensurae et motus primi mobilis per inhaerentiam mensuratur, quia
soli illi inhaerentia est quasi subiecto et nulli alteri, et istud est tempus correspondens primo mo-
tui primi mobilis. Est aliud tempus spatiale, id est quasi particulare spatialiter et particulariter
sumptum et istud sic respondet motui particulari, quia sibi existenter inhaeret. Praemisso hoc
pono duas conclusiones. Prima est ista, quod omnium temporalium est unicum tempus, L.'] om-
nium aliorum mensura motuum extrinseca. Hoc probatur. Omnium motuum est aliquis motus
primus et ipsorum regula, igitur et ipsorum omnium est unum tempus [...] De isto tempore dicit
Aristoteles quod impossibile est ipsum plurificari, sicut nee mobilia prima, nec motus prirni. In
omni enim genere entium est dare unum primum ad quod omnia reducuntur. Secunda conclusio
est haec, quod tempus particulare vel spatiale necessario est plurificabile, ita quod ad plurifica-




These comments shed some light on the above aporiae. It seems they
can be solved if we accept that 'time' is meant there to stand for particular
time, which obviously is really different from the motion of the primum
mobile, or motion taken in general, because it corresponds to a particular
motion.
In this way, we have come to the final problem of the Quaestiones, the
question whether time exists beyond the soul. The question is repeatedly
addressed in several places within the Quaestiones but unlike the preceding
one, it is always answered in a uniform way. As has been said above, our
author rejects the opinion of Peter Auriol that time and aevum exist only
in the soul. He adds that this proposition was one of the articles con-
demned by the bishop of Paris.V His own solution is that time is a formal
being that exists totally beyond the soul. He argues that it is unimaginable
to claim that time is formally in the soul and materially beyond it present-
ing a number of arguments. In the first place, changes that occur in time
take place without any operation of the intellect. Secondly, the termini
of time, i.e. prius et post, are opposite and cannot exist at the same time
in their formal subject, whereas in the intellect, sense, or medium they
are not opposite. Thirdly, in time facts are always co-ordinated as occur-
ring at the same time or one after another; in the soul there is no such con-
straint and facts can be analysed separately from one another. The final re-
mark observes that time must exist beyond the soul for it is a subject of
consideration of a physicist, who is not interested in mere products of
the soul." The external existence of time is characterised as an imperfect
aliquis sit motus sine temporis praesentia, quae sit eius mensura. Ista (opinio) patet cuilibet phi-
losophanti, quia omnis motus tempore mensuratur. Sed cessante motu primi mobilis et per con-
sequens primum tempus cessabit, L..J potest etiam esse aliquis motus hie inferius, igitur oportet
quod sibi respondeat proprium tempus, quod sit eius mensura. Maior probatur per istam Scrip-
turam [.. .J sic.Tn Iosue habetur planum quod cessante motu primo erat motus pugnantium.
Idem, Augustinus quod cessante motu coeli moveri posset rota figuli, Ratione etiam sic: quia
Deus posset absoluta distincta essentialiter quorum unum ab altero non dependet essentialiter
facere unum sine alio, ista sunt huiusmodi, igitur (etc.)».
42 Iui, f. 83v-84r: «Contra istam opinionem (Aureoli) arguitur. Dicit enim tria manifesta
falsa, primo enim hoc quod dicit tempus esse ab anima. Hoc enim [...] est articulus excommu-
nicatus parisinus per opinionem parisiensis (episcopi) et totam universitatem, qui determinave-
runt esse erroneum aevum et tempus ponere in sola apprehensione animae, et ponitur sub cen-
tesimo nonagesimo nono».
43 lui, f. 80r-v: «Tempus habet esse formale et appropriatum quantum ad eius entitatem to-
tam extra animam. Unde non imaginor sicut quod dam quod sit form aliter ab anima et materia-
liter praeter animam, quia ex ente extra animam et in materia nulla est entitas. Pono igitur quod
est extra animam omni actu intellectus circumscripto L..] Item, sine effectu animae potest esse
transitus a contrario in contrarium et a contradictorio in contradictorium. Sed hoc non potest
esse nisi in tempore, igitur (etc.) L..] Sed unum prius et aliud post, quae sunt etiam ipsum tem-
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act, i.e. one mixed with potency. It is a mode of existence proper to suc-
cessive beings, which only come into being.?"
It must be noted, however, that our author somewhat softens his
stance by admitting that time can be understood in a twofold way. If
we analyse it in its continuity, i.e. its extension in the continuous flow,
it has nothing to do with the soul. On the other hand, if we analyse it with
respect to duration of a precisely determined period in the past or in the
future, regardless of their relation to the present, then this understanding
of time must include the operation of the soul, because it is the source of
discretion contained in such concept of time. Discretion, as opposite to
continuity, which is an essential property of time, can only be externally
introduced into time.t"
So much for the Quaestiones supra libros Physicorum. Now it is time to
ask the fundamental question: can the doctrine of time presented there be
pus, supponunt etiam quando et quando autem est quod relinquitur ex adiacentia temp oris ad
rem temporalem, igitur (etc.). Item, in ilIo non esset tempus secundum esse formale proprium,
in quo opposita temp oris non habent oppositum et repugnantiam. Sed opposita temporis non ha-
bent oppositum et repugnantiam in esse apprehenso, igitur (etc.), Maior probatur, quia quaecum-
que opponuntur, habent oppositum in ilIo, in quo habent suum esse formale, verbi gratia album et
nigrum sunt opposita et habent esse in sensu et in intellectu obiective, et in medio et in causa, et in
subiecto, et nullam oppositionem habent in intellectu, quia simul possunt intelligere, nee in visu,
quia simul possunt videri, nee in causa, quia simul ibi possunt esse, nee in medio per eandem ra-
tionem. Sed tamen habent oppositionem in subiecto ubi est formale eorum. Maior probo, quia
oppositum temporis secundum Augustinum et Philosophum, quarto Physicorum, sunt prius et
post; ista autem impressione animae sunt simul natura, id est naturali intelligentia, ut habetur
in permanentis, igitur (etc.), Secundo sic: in ilIo non est tempus form aliter a quo vel in quo anima
temporalitei non habet simultatem, prioritatem et posterioritatem. Sed hoc non habet in esse ap-
prehenso, igitur (etc.), Haec minor probatur, quia (inter) ilia quae fuerint simul facta, unum potest
intelligere sine alio vel prius alio vel post aliud. ilia etiam quorum unum fuit prius alio possunt
simul intelligere vel posterius factum potest intelligere prius, igitur (etc.). Item, nullum factum
ab anima est ens reale. Sed ilIud quod non est ens reale non est de consideratione physici, igitur
a primo ad ultimum tempus non est de consideratione physici, quod est falsum».
44 lvi, f. 93r: «Tempus et alia omnia successiva [...] habent tamen esse tertio modo, scilicet
in actu permixto potentiae, hoc est imperfecto, quia tantum in fieri. Et ideo partes temporis sunt
eo modo, quo eis potest competere esse».
45 lvi, f. 80v: «Tempus potest sumi dupliciter uno modo quantum ad eius continuitatem, sive
pro ilia extensione in fluxu continuo etc. - circa hanc continuitatem nihil facit anima; alio modo
potest considerari quantum ad eius discretionem praescindendo et distinguendo ilIud, quod prae-
teriit, quod iam acquisitum et pertransitum, ab ilIo quod futurum est, nee in sui futuritione est, et
unum quodque istorum considerando inter terminos proprios praeteriti vel futuri, et futuri ut fu-
turi, non considerando annexionem eorum in praesenti indivisibili ete. habent naturam disereto-
rum; et ilIo modo anima se habet ad ista. Sed non solum ut contracta sunt ab ea, sed quasi in-tali
esse cognoscibili et praeciso et discreto posita. Talem enim discretionem et praecisionem non ha-
bent nisi ab anima. Hoc probatur, quia cuicumque ex natura rei inest continuitas, eidem ex natura
rei non inest discretio. Patet, quia sunt oppositae differentiae quantitatis. Sed tempori ex natura rei
inest continuitas, igitur impossibile est quod simul ex natura rei insit discretio».
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labelled as Scotism? This may be established by comparison. Fortunately,
there are several points of reference, both in Scotus' Quaestiones super Me-
taphysicam and in the works of his disciples. In the latter case, I shall look
into the works of Antonius Andreae, to whom the text was attributed, and
Landulf of Caracciolo, whose opinions were quoted with approval several
times in the questions.
Scotus devotes only one question to the problem of time in relation to
motion; in question 10 from book V he discusses whether time is the
quantity that makes motion a quantity (Utrum quantitas qua motus est
quantus sit tempus). Yet, even in this relatively short question we can find
a number of traits, which could serve as sources for our author. Accord-
ing to Duns Scotus time is a measure of motion, and as a measure it must
be really different from motion. The quantities of time, motion, and mag-
nitude are distinct from one another, and consequently, what their re-
spective parts are conjoined to is also distinct for each of the quantities:
instant for time and mutatum esse for motion (he does not mention point
for magnitudel.:" Aevum and time belong to the same genus of beings,
i.e. to the category of quantity, yet are in different genera of measures,
for they measure different things."? It is interesting to note that our
author had left out most of Scotus' discussion of aevum with respect to
instant or 'now' and time and made no mention of it in his questions. Ap-
parently, he must have been more sensitive to the fact that aevum does
not fit the subject of the Physics questions.
Antonius Andreae had addressed the problem of time more thoroughly
than Duns Scotus. Regrettably, his questions to the Physics are lost and the
only proposition from it that we know is the self-quotation in De tribus
principiis. Antonius says there that time is really identical with motion
though it is different from it formally." This statement, apparently contra-
dictory to the opinion of Scotus, has its direct counterpart in the list of pro-
positions concerning the relation between time and motion in our text. The
apparent contradiction may have given rise to the aporiae discussed above.
Another work of Antonius that can be analysed as a likely source of
inspiration for our author is his Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae.
In it, we fine] two questions focusing on the problems discussed by our
46 Cf. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam, ed. L. Wadding,
«<Opera omnia» IV) Lugduni, 1639, p. 631a.
47 lvi, p. 632b.
48 Cf. note 1 of this paper.
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author: Utrum idem nunc vel instans sit in toto tempore (book Ill, q. 3) and
Utrum tempus sit idem cum motu (book V, q. 11). It seems no coincidence
that these titles closely resemble those of our author's; their contents bear
striking similarities, too. The similarities range from the way problems are
discussed, for instance in both works the discussion of the relation between
time and motion is preceded by distinctions concerning types of motion,
time and measure, to the solutions, to particular arguments, e.g. the ra-
tiones principales of both questions on the instant contain the same argu-
ment saying that if there is only one 'now' in all time, things that happened
in AD 1000 and today, would be simultaneous."?
The solutions given in both works are convergent on most important
issues. In Antonius' Metaphysics questions, we can find some familiar pro-
positions. Antonius distinguishes between two types of time, general and
spatial, which correspond to the motion of the primum mobile and parti-
cular mobile objects, respectively. He states that time is really identical
with motion and instant with mutatum esse, yet they have distinct natures,
or are different only secundum rationem. There are two ways of measuring:
something is measured intrinsically, when the measure is really identical
with the measured object, e.g. the common time and the motion of the pri-
mum mobile; something is measured extrinsically, when the measure is
really different from the measured object, e.g. the common time and par-
ticular motions. Divisibility of time is introduced by something different
from it. In all time 'now' or instant does not remain substantially the
same. so Although these similarities are probably insufficient to state that
49 ANTONIUS (?), Quaestiones..., f. 83v: «Quaeritur utrum instans secundum substantiam sit
idem vel maneat idem et unum in toto tempore. Et videtur quod non, quia sequeretur quod ilia, quae
sunt nunc facta, et ilia, quae sunt infra millessimum annum, essent simul, saltem similitate secundum
substantiam. Si nee secundum substantiam, nee secundum esse est possibile, igitur (etc.)».
ANTONIUS ANDREAE, Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae, Venetiis, 1491, p. 15va:
«Sed contra istam opinionem L..] arguitur L..] sic: ilia dicuntur simul, quae sunt in eodem nunc
indivisibili. Si ergo idem est nunc in toto tempore, ergo quae fuerunt in miliesimo anno et quae
sunt hodie erunt simul, quod est falsum evidenter».
50 lvi, f. 26ra-b: «Tempus est duplex, scilicet commune et spatiale [...] Primum L..] respon-
det motui primo pro mensura, L..] secundum L..] est numerus motus L..] et tale tempus spatiale
est propria mensura motus inferioris, ita quod quot sunt motus particulares, tot sunt tempora
huismodi spatialia. Tempus est idem realiter cum motu, ita et nunc cum mutato esse. Tamen
cum ilia identitate reali stat aliqua distinctio ex natura rei, vel saltem secundum rationem [...]
Tempus commune, quod est passio primi motus, distinguitur realiter a motu inferiori [...] Tamen
hoc non obstante quodlibet tempus est idem realiter cum proprio motu, cuius est passio et pro-
pria mensura.
Cum dicitur quod mensura et mensuratum differunt realiter, dico quod verum est de men-
sura extrinseca, et sic comparando tempus commune ad motus inferiores».
lvi, f. 15vb: «Nunc est aliud et aliud secundum substantiam in toto tempore».
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our author modelled his questions on the ones by Antonius, still it seems
plausible enough that he may have known them.
The final reference point is Landulf of Caracciolo, who was the only
contemporary philosopher quoted by name and with approval by the
author of our questions. Beside the 'definition' of time as continuous quan-
tity we can find a number of other propositions and concepts that seem to
come from his commentary on the Sentences. The most noteworthy is the
distinction between the instant of time, which measures the indivisibles in
changes, and the instant of nature, which measures the being and not-
being of things. It seems that the distinction between the signa realia, signa
naturalia and signa ration is, the first of which cannot be assigned to an in-
stant, in contrast to the other two, also comes from Landulf's work."
Putting everything together, we can offer a few words of conclusion.
The Quaestiones in libros Physicorum is, indeed, a Scotist work. It is a skil-
fully prepared, though not very original, piece of scholastic commentary.
Its author borrows his opinions from authors, whose credentials as expo-
nents of 'pure' teaching of Scotus are strong (but much less from Scotus
himself), and argues against the views of those thinkers, who were openly
critical towards the teachings of the Subtle Doctor, most of all Peter Aur-
iol. He is well informed of the opinions circulating among the Franciscan
scholars in Paris at the turning of the first and second quarter of the 14th
century and is able to assess their proximity to or distance from the doc-
trine of Duns Scotus. In this way, his work is a valuable document of
the early development of Scotism.
51 Cf. N. KRETZMANN, Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction and Change, in N. Kretzmann
(ed.), Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Ithaca & London, Cornell Uni-
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